The Use of Welfare by Migrants in Italy

A large part of the Italian welfare system is designed and implemented at the very local level, leading to a high degree of heterogeneity in the type and the generosity of available programs across the country. As a consequence, studies of welfare use based on standard household surveys may fail to consider a large part of welfare recipients and provisions. In this paper I overcome such a problem by combining the analysis of welfare use in the Italian sample of the European Survey of Incomes and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) with theinvestigation of a new administrative archive that contains information on means tests certificates needed for applying to all kind of locally administered welfare programs. Results show that, without controlling for observable characteristics, migrants from outside the EU are more likely to receive or apply for welfare. Once individual and household characteristics are controlled for, such a residual welfare dependency is greatly reduced but does not disappear Geographical location is a key factor, given that migrants tend to locate in therichest areas of the country, which also happen to be the ones where the local welfare is most generous

The Use of Welfare by Migrants in Italy

A large part of the Italian welfare system is designed and implemented at the very local level, leading to a high degree of heterogeneity in the type and the generosity of available programs across the country. As a consequence, studies of welfare use based on standard household surveys may fail to consider a large part of welfare recipients and provisions. In this paper I overcome such a problem by combining the analysis of welfare use in the Italian sample of the European Survey of Incomes and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) with the investigation of a new administrative archive that contains information on means tests certificates needed for applying to all kind of locally administered welfare programs. Results show that, without controlling for observable characteristics, migrants from outside the EU are more likely to receive or apply for welfare. Once individual and household characteristics are controlled for, such a residual welfare dependency is greatly reduced but does not disappear. Geographical location is a key factor, given that migrants tend to locate in the richest areas of the country, which also happen to be the ones where the local welfare is most generous.migration, welfare

The Younger, the Better? Relative Age Effects at University

In this paper we estimate relative age effects in academic performance using a unique database of students at Bocconi University. The identification exploits school entry cut-off ages that generate up to 11 months difference between the youngest and the oldest students within each cohort. Our data allow to control for potential selection issues as well as for differences in cognitive ability, as measured by an attitudinal entry test. Contrary to most of the existing evidence for primary school children, we document that in university the youngest students perform better compared to their oldest peers, particularly in the most technical subjects. To rationalize this result we produce additional evidence on relative age effects in cognitive ability and in social behavior using a combination of data from Bocconi admission tests and from a survey on the social behavior of Italian first-year university students. We find that the youngest students in the cohort perform slightly better in cognitive tests and also appear to have less active social lives: they are less likely to do sports, go to discos and have love relationships. These results suggest that negative relative age effects in university performance might be generated by two mechanisms: (i) a profile of cognitive development that might be decreasing already around age 20; (ii) psychological relative age effects that lead the youngest in a cohort to develop social skills (self-esteem, leadership) at a slower pace. Younger students, thus, have less active social lives and devote more time to studying, as confirmed by additional evidence from the PISA study.education, relative age

Understanding Social Interactions: Evidence from the Classroom

There is a large literature on social interactions and still little is known about the economic mechanisms leading to the high level of clustering in behavior that is so commonly observed in the data. In this paper we present a model in which agents are allowed to interact according to three distinct mechanisms, and we derive testable implications on the mean and the variance of the outcomes within and across groups. The empirical tests allow us to distinguish which mechanism(s) generates the observed patterns in the data. In our application we study the performance of undergraduate students and we find that social interactions take the form of mutual insurance. Such a result bears crucial policy implications for all those situations in which social interactions are important, from teamwork to class formation in education and co-authorship in academic research.social interactions, peer effects, teamwork

Evaluating Students' Evaluations of Professors

This paper contrasts measures of teacher effectiveness with the students' evaluations for the same teachers using administrative data from Bocconi University (Italy). The effectiveness measures are estimated by comparing the subsequent performance in follow-on coursework of students who are randomly assigned to teachers in each of their compulsory courses. We find that, even in a setting where the syllabuses are fixed and all teachers in the same course present exactly the same material, teachers still matter substantially. The average difference in subsequent performance between students who were assigned to the best and worst teacher (on the effectiveness scale) is approximately 43% of a standard deviation in the distribution of exam grades, corresponding to about 5.6% of the average grade. Additionally, we find that our measure of teacher effectiveness is negatively correlated with the students' evaluations: in other words, teachers who are associated with better subsequent performance receive worst evaluations from their students. We rationalize these results with a simple model where teachers can either engage in real teaching or in teaching-to-the-test, the former requiring higher students’ effort than the latter. Teaching-to-the-test guarantees high grades in the current course but does not improve future outcomes. Hence, if students are myopic and evaluate better teachers from which they derive higher utility in a static framework, the model is capable of predicting our empirical finding that good teachers receive bad evaluations, especially when teaching-to-the-test is very effective (for example, with multiple choice tests). Consistently with the predictions of the model, we also find that classes in which high skill students are over-represented produce evaluations that are less at odds with estimated teacher effectiveness.teacher quality, postsecondary education

Evaluating students' evaluations of professors

This paper contrasts measures of teacher effectiveness with the students’ evaluations of the same teachers using administrative data from Bocconi University (Italy). The effectiveness measures are estimated by comparing the subsequent performance in follow-on coursework of students who are randomly assigned to teachers in each of their compulsory courses. We find that, even in a setting where the syllabuses are fixed, teachers still matter substantially. Additionally, we find that our measure of teacher effectiveness is negatively correlated with the students’ evaluations of professors: in other words, teachers who are associated with better subsequent performance receive worse evaluations from their students. We rationalize these results with a simple model where teachers can either engage in real teaching or in teaching-to-the-test, the former requiring greater student effort than the latter. Teaching-to-the-test guarantees high grades in the current course but does not improve future outcomes. Hence, if students are short-sighted and give better evaluations to teachers from whom they derive higher utility in a static framework, the model is capable of predicting our empirical finding that good teachers receive bad evaluations.teacher quality, postsecondary education

Liberalizing Professional Services: Evidence from Italian Lawyers

This paper presents a new model of occupational licensing, where producers are heterogeneous both in their ability or productivity and in the level of the barriers to entry in the profession that they face. The model bears important implications on the effects of liberalization policies that differ dramatically from those implied by the standard model, where heterogeneity is unidimensional in productivity. Specifically, we find that liberalization policies induce higher quality of services if barriers to entry are high for the most able agents. The opposite if such a correlation is low. We test these implications using detailed microdata on Italian lawyers and find a strong effect of the 2006 Italian liberalizing reform on the composition of the outflows from the legal profession. While higher ability lawyers are more likely to leave the profession before the reform, the opposite happens in its aftermaths, consistently with the idea that monopoly power selects high-productivity lawyers out of the profession

Class Size and Class Heterogeneity

We study how class size and composition affect the academic and labor market performances of college students, two crucial policy questions given the secular increase in college enrollment. We rely on the random assignment of students to teaching classes. Our results suggest that a one standard deviation increase in the class-size would result in a 0.1 standard deviation deterioration of the average grade. Further, the effect is heterogenous as female and higher income students seem almost immune to the size of the class. Also, the effects on performance of class composition in terms of gender and ability appears to be inverse U-shaped. Finally, a reduction of 20 students (one standard deviation) in one's class size has a positive effect on monthly wages of about 80 Euros (115 USD) or 6% over the average.class size, heterogeneity, experimental evidence, academic performance, wages

The search behaviour of firms and workers in OECD labour markets

Most labour economists today agree on a view of the labour market in which various types of imperfections prevent firms with unfilled vacancies and workers who want a job to meet readily. This dissertation explores several empirical aspects of the behaviour of workers and firms in search for partners to form employment relationships. The first chapter looks at the effect of the interaction between welfare programmes on the search behaviour of the unemployed. It suggests that unemployment insurance recipients, who are also entitled to some kind of social assistance, are less concerned about changes in their unemployment benefits. Empirical evidence from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) shows that the unemployed who are eligible for social assistance programmes leave unemployment at a lower rate than similar individuals who only receive unemployment compensation. The second chapter looks at the characteristics of jobs found through formal and informal methods. Data from the ECHP show that wage premiums and wage penalties to finding jobs through personal contacts are equally frequent and of about the same size. This result is rationalised with a simple model in which firms choose their optimal recruitment strategies. In labour markets where employers invest heavily in formal recruitment, matches created through this channel are of better quality than those created through informal networks. The empirical predictions of the theory are successfully tested using a combination of the ECHP and industry- level data on recruitment costs. The last chapter uses an original sample of British recruits to investigate the role of employers' recruitment strategies on labour turnover. A simple extension of the model presented in the previous chapter shows that firms invest more in recruitment for high-productivity jobs, that this leads to better matches and, consequently, to lower turnover at the top than at the bottom of the jobs' distribution